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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on FDI and economic growth. We deviate from
previous studies by introducing measures of the volatility of FDI inflows. As introduced into
the model, these are predicted to have a negative effect on growth. We estimate the standard
model using cross-section, panel data and instrumental variable techniques. Whilst all results
are not entirely robust, there is a consistent finding that FDI has a positive effect on growth
whereas volatility of FDI has a negative impact. The evidence for a positive effect of FDI is
not sensitive to which other explanatory variables are included. In particular, it is not
conditional on the level of human capital (as found in some previous studies). There is a
suggestion that it is not the volatility of FDI  per se that retards growth but that such volatility
captures the growth-retarding effects of unobserved variables.
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1. Introduction
There is now a considerable literature on the impact of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and growth. The contribution of this paper is to take the effect of volatility of
FDI flows on growth into account. Using a variety of econometric techniques, we
find that while FDI as such has (the expected) positive effect on growth, volatility of
such flows has a negative effect. There are a number of reasons why volatility of FDI
inflows may be negatively associated with growth. A first possibility is that volatility
itself has a negative effect on growth. The recent endogenous growth literature on
FDI provides some arguments why this might be so. This literature shows that FDI
positively affects growth by decreasing the costs of R&D through stimulating
innovation. If FDI inflows are uncertain, costs of R&D are uncertain, which
negatively affects incentives to innovate. It may then be the case that volatility of FDI
undermines investment, and thus has an adverse effect on growth.
A second possibility might be that the volatility of FDI flows is a proxy for economic
or political uncertainty; FDI volatility may reflect underlying uncertainty (political
and economic) in a country. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Guillaumont and
Chavet (1999) suggest that economic uncertainty is an important determinant of both
growth and the productivity of investment. By ‘economic uncertainty’ they refer to
the tendency of some developing countries to be particularly vulnerable to shocks
that have the immediate effect of reducing income and, if recurrent, tend to reduce
growth (or constrain the ability of an economy to reach its steady state growth rate).
These shocks may be external, such as terms of trade shocks or financial crises
induced by the volatility of capital flows, or ‘acts of nature’, such as severe drought
or floods. While FDI tends to be less volatile than other private flows, it is possible
that sudden changes in the volume of FDI inflows can have a destabilising impact on
the economy.
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of FDI on growth, specifically
accounting for volatility. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the relevant existing
literature on FDI. Section 3 presents a model incorporating volatility of FDI. The data
and measures used are described in Section 4 and the results are discussed in Section
5. The conclusions are in Section 6.
2.  A Brief Overview of the Literature
The contribution of FDI to economic growth has been debated quite extensively in
the literature. The ‘traditional’ argument is that an inflow of FDI improves economic
growth by increasing the capital stock, whereas recent literature points to the role of
FDI as a channel of international technology transfer. There is growing evidence that
FDI enhances technological change through technological diffusion, for example3
because multinational firms are concentrated in industries with a high ratio of R&D
relative to sales and a large share of technical and professional workers (Markusen,
1995). Multinational corporations are probably among the most technologically
advanced firms in the world. Moreover, FDI not only contributes to imports of more
efficient foreign technologies, but also generate technological spillovers for local
firms.
In this approach, technological change plays a pivotal role in economic growth and
FDI by multinational corporations is one of the major channels in providing
developing countries (LDCs) with access to advanced technologies. The knowledge
spillovers may take place via imitation, competition, linkages and/ or training
(Kinoshita, 1998; Sjoholm, 1999). Although it is in practice rather difficult to
distinguish between these four channels, the underlying theory differs.
The imitation channel is based on the view that domestic firms may become more
productive by imitating the more advanced technologies or managerial practices of
foreign firms (the more so the greater the technology gap). In the absence of FDI,
acquiring the necessary information for adopting new technologies is too costly for
local firms. Thus, FDI lowers the cost of technology adoption and may expand the set
of technologies available to local firms. The competition channel emphasises that the
entrance of foreign firms intensifies competition in the domestic market, encouraging
domestic firms to become more efficient by upgrading their technology base.
The linkages  channel stresses that foreign firms may transfer new technology to
domestic firms through transactions with these firms. By purchasing raw materials or
intermediate goods a strong buyer-seller relationship may develop that gives rise to
technical assistance or training from the foreign firm to the domestic firm. Finally,
the  training  channel arises if the introduction of new technologies requires an
upgrading of domestically available human capital. New technologies can only be
adopted when the labour force is able to work with them. The entrance of foreign
firms may give an incentive to domestic firms to train their own employees. If labour
moves from a multinational to a local firm (through labour turnover), the physical
movement of workers causes knowledge to move between firms.
Empirical evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for local firms is mixed
(see Saggi, 2000, for a survey).  Some studies find positive spillover effects, some
find no effects and some even conclude that there are negative effects (on the latter
see Aitken and Harrison, 1999). This does not necessarily imply that FDI is not
beneficial for growth (for a survey of FDI and growth in LDCs, see De Mello and
Luiz. 1997). It may be that the spillovers are of a different nature. Aitken et al4
(1997), for instance, point to the importance of the entry of multinationals for
reducing entry costs of other potential exporters. Moreover, FDI may also contribute
to growth by means of an increase in capital flows and the capital stock.
Some recent studies have argued that the contribution of FDI to growth is strongly
dependent on the circumstances in recipient countries. Balasubramanyam et al (1996)
find that the effect on growth is stronger in countries with a policy of export
promotion than in countries that pursue a policy of import substitution. In a very
influential paper, Borensztein et al (1998) suggest that the effectiveness of FDI
depends on the stock of human capital in the host country. Only in countries where
human capital is above a certain threshold does FDI positively contribute to growth.
Borensztein  et al (1998) develop a growth model in which technical progress, a
determinant of growth, is represented through the variety of capital goods available.
Technical progress is itself determined by FDI as foreign firms encourage adoption
of new technologies and increase the production of capital goods, hence increase
variety. Thus, FDI leads to growth via technology spillovers that increase factor
productivity. Certain host country conditions are necessary to ensure the spillover
effects. In particular, human capital (an educated labour force) is necessary for new
technology and management skills to be absorbed. This is discussed in Appendix B.
Investment, Volatility and Uncertainty
Where the issue is addressed, empirical studies consistently find a negative effect of
uncertainty (measured in various ways) on investment. Serven (1998) uses seven
measures of uncertainty for five variables (such as growth, terms of trade) and finds
evidence for all having a negative impact on levels of private investment for a large
sample of developing countries.  As investment is a robust determinant of growth
 we
hypothesise that uncertainty will have a negative impact on growth.
A number of recent papers have begun to address aspects of risk and vulnerability in
the context of the aid-growth relationship (and we note that investment is the
principal mechanism through which aid enhances growth). Lensink and Morrissey
(2000) argue that aid instability, measured as a residual of an autoregressive trend
estimate of aid receipts, can proxy for two forms of uncertainty that may be growth-
reducing. First is recipient uncertainty regarding future aid receipts, which may have
adverse effects on investment.  Second, is economic uncertainty, as the incidence of
shocks will tend to attract unanticipated aid, hence increase measured instability of
aid flows. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find that the coefficient on the aid
instability measure is negative and significant and infer that economic uncertainty is5
growth-retarding. This result is robust for the sample of African countries and the full
sample of developing countries.
Guillaumont and Chauvet (1999) address the implications of including a measure of
the  ‘vulnerability’ of the economic environment (what we term economic
uncertainty) in an aid-growth regression. They construct an index of a ‘good
environment’ comprising four variables. First is the instability of agricultural value
added, to capture the effect of climatic shocks. This is weighted by the ratio of
agricultural value added to GDP to represent the significance of the shock. Long-term
trade shocks are represented by the trend of the terms of trade, while the index of
instability of the real value of exports represents short-term shocks. The logarithm of
population captures the degree of exposure to trade shocks. All of these instabilities
are inverted and weighted to construct the index.
They find that growth is lower in more vulnerable economies and present evidence
that aid flows in greater amounts to countries suffering from adverse shocks (and aid
mitigates the adverse effects of vulnerability), which lends support to the
interpretation of Lensink and Morrissey (2000). Dehn and Gilbert (1999) look
specifically at instability of commodity prices (highly positively correlated with
export commodity concentration) and how this impacts on growth. They test the
hypothesis that vulnerability to commodity price variability reduces growth, and find
supporting evidence although much depends on how governments respond. An
appropriate government response can reverse the adverse effects of commodity price
variability, although an inappropriate response exacerbates the adverse effects.
3. Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a simple endogenous growth model in which FDI has a
positive effect on growth, whereas the volatility in FDI flows has a negative effect. In
the model FDI, as well as the volatility in FDI, affects growth via the cost of
innovation. The model is in line with the recent theories emphasising the importance
of FDI in enhancing technological change through technological diffusion. This
model provides an illustrative framework, which explains a possible channel by
which the volatility in FDI flows negatively affect growth.
Using the framework of the technological change models (see chapters 6 and 7 of
Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) it is possible to present a formal model which shows
how FDI may increase growth. We use a model with an expanding variety of
products, adapted from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 6) and following
Borensztein et al (1998), so that we can be brief about its structure.6
The model assumes that technical progress is represented through the variety of
capital goods available. There are three types of agents in the model: final goods
producers,  innovators and consumers. Each final goods’ producer rents N varieties of
capital good from specialised firms that produce a type of capital good (the
innovators). The producer has monopoly rights over the production and sale of the
capital goods. The purchase price Pj of the capital good is set by optimizing the
present value of the returns from inventing (and producing in several periods), V(t).
This leads to a fixed mark-up over production costs. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995:
218), assuming free entry of inventors, show that in equilibrium with positive R&D
(at cost η ) and increasing N, the (constant) rate of return (interest rate, r) is given by:
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where α  measures capital’s share of income (coefficient in Cobb-Douglas production
function) and L is labour input.
We can now introduce FDI. The costs of production contain two parts. Each period
there are fixed maintenance costs, assumed equal to 1. In addition there are fixed set
up costs (R&D costs, η ). The costs of discovering a new variety of a good (costs of
innovation) are assumed to be the same for all goods. Moreover, assume that the
costs of discovering new goods depend on the ratio of goods produced in other
countries to those produced domestically. This ratio is a proxy for FDI. A higher ratio
of goods produced in other countries, and so more FDI, would lead to a decline in the
costs of innovation. This reflects the idea that it is cheaper to imitate than to innovate
(Borensztein et al, 1998), and that the possibility to imitate increases if more goods
are produced in other countries (i.e. when FDI is higher). The costs of discovering a
new good can be modelled as (using FDI = F): η  =f(F), where ∂η /∂ F < 0
To account for uncertainty with respect to F, we assume that F is stochastic, and
modelled as F = µ (F)+ε , where µ (F) is the mean of FDI and ε  is an error term with
ε ~N(0, ε
2). The certainty equivalent of the expected value of FDI equals:
E(F)= µ (F)-0.5Bσ
2(F)
where B is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (B is positive for risk-averse
innovators) and σ
2(F) refers to the variance in FDI inflows. Taking into account the
certainty equivalent value of FDI, and assuming that the rate of return on assets (r) is
constant and there is free entry, (1) can be written as:7
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Equation (2) shows that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in r  (remember
f′ (F)<0) whereas an increase in the variance of FDI leads to a decrease in r. To
introduce the link to economic growth we close the model by considering behaviour
of households. Households maximise a standard inter-temporal utility function,
subject to the budget constraint. This gives the well-know Euler condition for the
growth rate of consumption, gC = (1/θ )(r - ρ ), where -θ  is the elasticity of marginal
utility and ρ  is the discount rate. In the steady state the growth rate of consumption
equals the growth rate of output, g.
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It is now easy to see that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in the growth rate of
output (g). An increase in FDI lowers set-up costs (for technology adaptation) and
raises the return on assets (r). This leads to an increase in saving and so a higher
growth rate in consumption and output. However, an increase in the volatility of FDI
negatively affects growth as it decreases the certainty equivalent value of FDI and
consequently increases set-up costs and decreases the rate of return on assets.
4. Data and Measures of Uncertainty
There are a number of sources of data on FDI. The widest coverage is provided by
IMF balance of payments data on capital inflows, although direct investment and
loans are not consistently recorded. A more reliable series on FDI is provided by the
OECD, but only covers flows from OECD members. Both sources are combined in
UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports, the basic published source for cross-country
data. Other data are either from host countries’ reports of inflows of investment, or
compiled from surveys of investment activity. Such data are better suited to country
case studies. In this paper we use World Bank data on the FDI/GDP ratio (GFDI, in
percentages), as this provides wide coverage for a reasonably long period (1975-97).
1
                                                          
1 For comparability, we also use the Borensztein et al (1998) data on FDI (derived from
OECD). This covers somewhat fewer countries for a shorter time period.8
We use the average value of GFDI for the 1975-1998 period in the cross-section
estimates and average values for the sub-periods in the panel estimates.
For our cross-section estimates volatility of GFDI (UGFDI) is measured by taking
the standard deviation of errors from the autoregressive equation for GFDI with
lagged values over three periods and a time trend (see Lensink and Morrissey, 2000).
This equation is estimated for all countries over the 1975-1997 period. This is,
admittedly, only an approximate measure of volatility. However, given that the time
series available are rather brief, more sophisticated measures of volatility are not
justified. By saving the error terms from this regression, we can measure volatility as
the standard deviation of the errors. We also use a relative measure of volatility
(RATIO = UGFDI/GFDI). For our panel estimates the volatility in FDI is estimated
similarly. However, in order to have enough degrees of freedom we do not take into
account the second and third order autoregressive terms in the autoregressive
equation for GFDI. We estimate this equation for all countries, as well as all sub-
periods, distinguished in the panel estimates.
The dependent variable in the basic cross-section regressions is the per capita growth
rate of GDP over the 1970-1998 period (GRO). In the panel estimates we distinguish
three periods: 1970-1980; 1980-1990 and 1990-1998. Per capita growth rates are
calculated for these sub-periods. Following the empirical growth literature, a number
of ‘standard’ explanatory variables are included in addition to the FDI variables. The
most important of these are the initial values of GDP per capita (LNGDPPC1) and
the secondary school enrolment rate (LNSEC1), both measured in logs (for 1970 in
the cross-section estimates and for 1970; 1980 and 1990 in the panel estimates).
Other variables are the black market premium (BMP) and government consumption
expenditure as a share of GDP (GOV). A range of political and institutional
indicators are also used in estimating the instruments equations; these are discussed
below when introduced. Definitions and sources for all variables are provided in
Appendix A. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the
analysis. Table 2 gives a correlation matrix.
Table 1: Descritive Statistics
GRO LNGDPPC1 LNSEC1 GFDI RATIO
Mean 1.381 7.600 2.946 1.297 0.508
Median 1.387 7.495 3.113 0.636 0.432
Maximum 6.476 9.284 4.625 9.538 2.140
Minimum -3.701 5.832 0 0.008 0.148
Std. Dev 1.886 0.968 1.136 1.637 0.3219
Skewness 1.321 0.171 -0.551 2.410 2.476
Kurtosis 3.591 1.921 2.545 10.075 11.107
Observations 88 88 88 88 88
Note: statistics are based on averages used in cross-section estimates. They refer to
statistics with common samples. This also applies to Table 2.
Table 2: Correlation matrix
GRO LNGDPPC1 LNSEC1 GFDI RATIO
GRO 1.000
LNGDPPC1 0.171 1.000
LNSEC1 0.482 0.807 1.000
GFDI 0.273 0.504 0.387 1.000
RATIO -0.305 -0.227 -0.281 -0.238 1.000
5. Econometric  Results
The data set described in Section 4 has two number advantages over that of
Borensztein et al (1998). First, the coverage is up to 115 countries, although usually
we only have all data for 77-90 countries. Second, the GFDI data is annual (essential
to calculate UGFDI). As we have a different sample and incorporate volatility, our
results are not directly comparable to Borensztein et al (1998); we present an attempt
to replicate their results in Appendix B.
Cross-section Estimates
We begin with a simple OLS growth regression including foreign direct investment.
We use a linearised version of the equation derived in the model and estimate
variants of the following equation:
g = c0 + c1FDI + c2Volatility + c3H + c4Y0 +e
Table 3 shows that FDI has a positive effect on growth, whereas volatility of FDI has
a negative effect, as predicted by the model. The latter holds both for UGFDI and
RATIO (this relative measure is the preferred indicator of volatility as UGFDI is
highly correlated with FDI). The coefficient on initial GDP is negative and
significant, suggesting convergence, while that on initial education is positive and
significant. The table shows that the result is robust for including BMP and GOV.
The explanatory power, at just over 0.5, is quite good for such types of regressions,
and roughly twice the value obtained in Borensztein et al (1998) regressions (see
Appendix B).10
Borensztein et al (1998), in a very influential paper, argue that certain host country
conditions are necessary to ensure the spillover effects of FDI. In particular, human
capital (an educated labour force) is necessary for new technology and management
skills to be absorbed. As indicated above (see Appendix B), they include the
interactive term FDI.H (where H is the measure of schooling) to capture this effect.
They find that the coefficient on FDI is negative (when significant) but the
coefficient on the interaction term (FDI.H) is positive and consistently significant.
This is interpreted as implying that FDI has a positive impact on growth but this is
only realised when H is above some critical level (estimated as 0.52); at low levels of
H FDI has a negative impact on growth.
The last column in Table 3 presents an estimate in which we take the
complementarity of FDI and our schooling variable into account. It appears that our
basic result still holds: FDI has a positive effect on growth and the volatility in FDI
has a negative effect. Note that we do not confirm the Borensztein et al results: the
interaction term between schooling and FDI is insignificant.






































































REGECA -1.256 -1.132 -1.371 -0.901 -1.474 -1.20511


























2 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56
F 16.05 15.24 15.32 13.67 14.08 12.07
n 8 98 98 8 8 8 8 88 8
Notes: t-values in parenthesis are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors. Only significant region dummies (dummies for REGECA; REGLAC
and REGSSA) are taken into account.
In Appendix B (table B1) we attempt to estimate the Borensztein et al (1998) model:
we use the same variables as they employ, although do not have an identical sample.
Again, we fail to find a significant coefficient on the interactive term. We note that
the results in Table 3 are based on a larger sample (of countries and over time) and
have a higher explanatory power.
Panel Estimates
A major drawback of the cross-section estimates in Table 3 is that time series
properties are not taken into account; they should be interpreted as representing
aggregate correlations over the long period. We therefore run regressions for a panel
in which three, roughly 10-year, periods are considered (1970-1980; 1980-1990;
1990-1998). Using panel estimates, we are able to address fixed effects, an important
omitted variable in cross-country growth regressions. Table 4 presents the results.
The results concerning FDI and the volatility of FDI are consistent with the cross-
country estimates: FDI has a positive effect on growth, whereas volatility negatively
affects growth. Note that the human capital variable is now insignificant, or
significant but with the ‘wrong’ sign. The reason might be that there simply is not
enough variation in LNSEC1 and that the variable behaves like a fixed effect. We
estimate an equation in line with Borensztein et al, including our volatility measure
and an interactive term(column 6). Again it appears that we do not confirm the
Borensztein et al result. Note that the volatility in FDI is still significantly negative,
although FDI is no longer significant. The reason might be that due to including the
interactive term a lot of multicollinearity enters the model, making the independent
FDI variable insignificant.12
It might be relevant to further assess the sensitivity effect of FDI and the volatility in
FDI on growth by using alternative measures of FDI, as well as alternative measures
for the other variables in the equation. As far as we could we used the data set of
Borensztein  et al (1998) for these alternative estimates. The definitions of their
variables differ from ours on the following points: 1) they only have FDI data for two
ten year periods (1970-1980 and 1980-1990). 2) their FDI data are based on OECD
data, whereas we use World Bank sources. 3) they scale the FDI data by using real
GDP data (from Penn World tables), whereas we used the FDI/GDP data from World
Bank sources in which nominal FDI is scaled by nominal GDP. 4) their H variable is
average years of secondary schooling for males (schooling). 5) they added the
logarithmic value of 1+BMP instead of BMP, and 6) they used real government
expenditures over real GDP (GOVB) as proxy for government expenditures (from the
Barro-Lee data set), whereas we used government expenditures as a percentage of
GDP from World Bank sources.



























































2 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.61
F 232.45 131.30 134.15 104.84 104.32 75.59
n 292 247 230 220 229 22913
Notes: t-values in parenthesis are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors. All estimates incorporate fixed effects.
For all variables, but FDI, we could replicate their data set by following their remarks
on data sources. We are grateful to Borensztein and Lee for providing their FDI data
and that is the measure used in our regressions in Table 5 (FDIB). We could not use
their data to estimate the volatility in FDI the data provided are for the period
averages. The volatility measure used in Table 5 is the one we constructed ourselves.



































































2 0.65 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.64
F 86.70 67.46 57.43 54.39 56.81
n 147 87 87 87 147
Notes: t-values in parenthesis are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors. All estimates are with fixed effects. Panel of two 10-year periods.
Note that due to differences in dimensions all coefficients, except those on FDIB, are
multiplied by 100 to make them comparable to the earlier tables.
The estimates using the alternative data provide some interesting results. First, FDIB
is only significant when the volatility in FDI is included (similar to our finding in14
column 6 of Table 4). Second, in line with Table 4, the schooling variable is always
insignificant or significant with the ‘wrong’ sign. Third, again in line with Table 4,
FDIB becomes insignificant when the interactive term schooling*FDIB is included.
Fourth, the interactive term is always insignificant (in line with earlier tables). Even
if we drop RATIO, and estimate the same equation as Borensztein et al (1998), by
using their data, the interactive term remains insignificant. Note that they did not
estimate the panel by using fixed effects, but used SUR and allowed for different
constants for the two periods. We therefore also allowed for a time dummy for the
1970s (DUM70) but this did not change the results (see also Appendix B).
Incorporating Instruments
A potential problem with the estimates presented above is that FDI is in principle
endogenous. This implies that OLS regressions are biased. The technique of
instrumental variable (IV) estimation can be used to address this problem. The issue
then is to find instruments for GFDI and volatility variables. We note that the IV
technique introduces problems of its own. In particular, it is difficult to find
instruments that are both good at predicting the variable of concern (FDI and its
volatility) yet are not determinants of the dependent variable. Furthermore, and
consequently, IV estimates tend not to be robust to choice of instruments.
There is a recent literature from proponents of a so-called ‘legal based view’ that may
be helpful in deciding which instruments can be used. These writers point to the
importance of establishing a legal environment in which financial markets can
develop effectively (La Porta et al. 1997; Levine 1997; Levine et al 1999). The legal
system determines the overall level and quality of financial services and hence
improves the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. Indirectly, the
legal system is probably also important in explaining FDI inflows as better legal
systems may improve protection of foreign investors. Similarly, the nature of the
regulatory environment may also be an important determinant of the attractiveness of
a country to foreign investors.
Following this literature, we use as instruments indicators of the legal system and the
regulatory environment. Six indicators for the regulatory environment or
‘governance’ are used.
2 GOVEFF is an indicator of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies. GRAFT is an indicator that measures
                                                          
2 Data for the six aggregate governance indicators was kindly provided by Pablo
Zoido-Lobaton and are based on data for 1997 and 1998. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton  (1999) provide a description and discussion.15
perceptions of corruption, interpreted as the exercise of public power for private gain.
RULEL is an indicator of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society. PINST is an index that combines indicators of perceptions of the
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by
possibly unconstitutional and/ or violent means. REGBURD is an indicator of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. Finally, VOICE
is an index of indicators of the extent to which citizens of a country are able to
participate in the selection of governments. These indicators are measured on a scale
of about -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to a ‘better’ regulatory
environment. Appendix A shows that these indicators are highly correlated, so they
are entered into regressions individually.
In addition to the three aggregate governance indicators, we also test the relevance of
some legal origin indicators (from Easterly and Yu, 1999). These are whether the
legal system is of British (LEGBR), French (LEGFR), Scandinavian (LEGSC) or
German (LEGGER) legal origin. The literature distinguishes between common law
and civil law countries. Civil law comes from Roman law and relies heavily on legal
scholars to formulate its rules, whereas the common law originates from English law
and relies on judges to resolve disputes. It is common to further distinguish between
French, German and Scandinavian civil law countries. La Porta et al (1997) argue
that common law countries offer more protection to both shareholders and creditors.
French civil law countries give the least protection, whereas German and
Scandinavian civil law countries are somewhere in between.
Table 6a: Instrumenting for GFDI






































































































2 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.67
F 12.51 12.76 11.29 9.62 9.37 8.62 27.67
n 106 105 112 105 112 115 105
t-values are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors







































































































2 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.31 0.07 0.13
F 2.55 2.07 2.85 2.54 9.37 2.36 3.07
n 105 104 111 104 112 114 95
t-values are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors
Table 6a presents estimates for the determinants of GFDI. All governance indicators,
except for VOICE, appear to perform well; the coefficients are positive and
significant. None of the legal origin dummies are significant, although LEGBR is
close in some regressions. The initial value of GDP per capita is important, as is the
initial value of FDI (GFDI1). Log value of country size (LNAREA) was included as
it is suggested by Borensztein et al. (1998) but is not significant.
Table 6b gives regressions for RATIO (relative volatility). The results show that an
improvement in a governance indicator leads to a decrease in the relative volatility of
FDI. Hence, improving governance helps in two ways: a) it increases FDI and 2) it
decreases the relative variability in FDI. However, in general the explanatory power
is extremely low, highlighting the difficulty of identifying good instruments for
volatility.
On the basis of Tables 6a and 6b we use one of the governance indicators (GRAFT),
LNGDPPC1, the lagged value for GFDI (GFDI1) as well as the lagged value for the
relative uncertainty (UGFDI1/GFDI) as instruments in 2SLS regressions. Table 7
presents the 2SLS results. These results confirm our hypothesis: FDI has a positive
effect on growth, but volatility of FDI has a negative effect on growth. The use of
instruments has resulted in results that are generally weaker than those found earlier,
as is often the case with IV techniques. Furthermore, the results confirm the
sensitivity of parameter estimates to choice of instruments.18
Aspects of the 2SLS estimates in Table 7 are revealing. The coefficient estimates on
GFDI are generally around 0.3, quite similar to the estimates in Table 3. This
suggests that the evidence for a positive impact of FDI on growth is quite robust and
not very sensitive to the choice of other explanatory variables. The coefficients on
instrumented RATIO are much higher than in Table 3 but only significant at the 10%
level, probably because the instrumenting regression is a poor fit. The decline in
significance of the coefficients on RATIO in Table 7 suggest that it is not FDI
volatility  per se that retards growth, but that such volatility is itself a proxy for
unobserved factors that retard growth. In column 3, when UGFDI (not instrumented)
is included, the striking effect is the increased size of the coefficient on GFDI. This
may simply be because the high correlation between GFDI and UGFDI persists even
when we instrument for the former; the broad pattern of results is unaffected. The
results in columns 4 and 5 are more difficult to interpret, but seem to suggest that
BMP and GOV do not have an independent effect on growth other than their effect
here picked up by FDI and its volatility (when they are included as instruments).







































































2 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.44
F 14.20 12.07 11.24 10.58 10.40 7.7919
n 8 3 7 7 7 87 77 77 7
Notes: Instrument list: (1) LNGDPPC1; LNSEC1; GFDI1; GRAFT; REGECA;
REGLAC; REGSSA and a constant. (2) same as (1) but includes UGDFI1/GFDI. (3),
same as (1) but includes UGFDI1. (4) same as (2) but includes BMP. (5) same as (2)
but includes GOV. (6) same as (2) but includes GOV, BMP and LNSEC1*GFDI1. In
all equations significant continental dummies REGECA; REGLAC and REGSSA are
taken into account. The t-values are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors.
6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on FDI and economic growth, by attempting
to incorporate effects due to the volatility of FDI inflows. Volatility was introduced
into the model as affected the expected costs (returns) of innovation, and in this way
is predicted to have a negative effect on growth. We estimate a standard growth
model including FDI and volatility using cross-section, panel data and instrumental
variable techniques. There is a consistent finding that FDI has a positive effect on
growth whereas volatility of FDI has a negative impact. These results are robust to
most, albeit not all, specifications. The evidence for a positive effect of FDI is not
sensitive to the other explanatory variables included, although the significance of the
estimated coefficient does vary according to the specification. In particular, it is not
conditional on the level of human capital (as found in some previous studies). Having
established that FDI appears to have a robust positive impact on growth, our next step
is to address factors that may mediate or enhance this.
In this paper, the additional variable we introduce is the volatility of FDI, which is
found to have a consistent negative impact on growth (although significance various
according to specification). There is a suggestion that it is not the volatility of FDI
per se that retards growth but that such volatility captures the growth-retarding
effects of unobserved variables. One possibility is that economies with high levels of
economic uncertainty will tend to have lower and/or more variable growth rates, and
may also appear less attractive to foreign investors. One issue to be pursued in future
work is to examine the underlying reasons for the volatility of FDI.
A general problem that plagues cross-country growth regressions is potential
endogeneity between growth and the variables of concern, in our case FDI. We
attempted to address this by instrumenting for FDI and volatility, but the resolution is
only partial. Future work can attempt to find better instruments for FDI, and
especially volatility. A particular problem with what we attempted here is that we
were only able to instrument for the ‘long-run’ as data on instruments was not20
available for the panel sub-periods. One option for future work is to eschew
instruments in favour of using lagged values (on the basis that current growth is not a
determinant of past values of FDI and its volatility). In order to do this while
preserving degrees of freedom, we need to develop the time series dimension of our
data (the measure of volatility is the major constraint here).
African countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are particularly
vulnerable to shocks, both external and natural. This vulnerability is related to the
general tendency for SSA countries to perform relatively badly in cross-country
growth regressions (an ‘Africa’ dummy is usually significantly negative, as transpires
to be the case in our results). Collier and Gunning (1999) address in detail the
features that may explain Africa’s poor growth performance and susceptibility to risk
is one specific adverse feature of Africa that they identify.  First, relative to other
regions, SSA is especially susceptible to climatic and agricultural risk, the effects of
which are made worse by poor soil quality and decades of policies biased against
agriculture. Second, export earnings are based on a narrow range of primary
commodities and SSA is especially vulnerable to terms of trade shocks. Future work
can attempt to address this issues, by identifying the unobserved factors that are
picked up by volatility.
For low-income countries, especially SSA, a particular issue is that FDI is highly
concentrated in natural resource sectors, especially extraction industries but also
plantation agriculture. The relationship between FDI and growth, and the volatility of
FDI, may be related to the sector concentration. For example, FDI in resource
extraction, and its impact on growth, may be less sensitive to economic uncertainty
than investment in manufacturing or production of primary commodities.
Unfortunately, we do not have data that disaggregates FDI by sector. By including
‘country-specific’ features in the next stage of analysis, we hope to be able to shed
some light on these issues.21
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Appendix A: Variables Used in the Study
Basic Variables
BMP = the average black market premium (%) for the 1970-1997 period. Source:
Easterly and Yu (1999).
GFDI= the average gross foreign direct investment over GDP ratio over 1975-1997
period. Source: World Bank (1999).
GFDI1: lagged value for GFDI. As no data are available for GFDI before 1975, we
took first available observation.
GOV = The average value of government  consumption as a percentage of GDP for
the 1970-1997 period. Source:  World Bank (1999).
GRO: the average real per capita growth rate over 1970-1998 period . Calculated
from real GDP per capita data in constant dollars. Source: Easterly and Yu (1999).
Original source: Penn World Table 5.6 (Summers-Heston data).  Missing data
calculated from 1985 GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth rates (Global
Development Finance & World Development Indicators).
LNAREA: a log value of area (the size of the country). Source: Easterly and Yu
(1999).
LNGDPPC1 = The logarithm of the 1970 value of real GDP per capita in constant
dollars (international prices, base year 1985). Source: Easterly and Yu (1999).
Original source: Penn World Table 5.6.
LNSEC1= log of The 1970 secondary school enrollment rate. Source: Easterly and
Yu (1999). Original source: Global Development Finance & World Development
Indicators.
UGFDI= “variability” or uncertainty in GFDI, measured by taking standard deviation
of errors of the equation GFDI= a1 GFDI(-1)+ a2 GFDI(-2) + a3 GFDI(-3)+ a4
TREND + C + e. This equation is estimated for all countries over the 1975-1997
period.
UGFDI1: is the lagged value of UGFDI. Since data for GFDI are not available before
1975, this is calculated by calculating the standard deviation of the error terms of an




The six aggregate governance indicators described below were kindly provided by
Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  (1999) for an
extensive description. Governance is measured on a scale of about -2.5 to 2.5 with
higher values corresponding to better outcomes. The data are based on data for 1997
and 1998. The variables are:24
1)  GOVEFF = An indicator of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies. It combines perceptions of the quality of public service
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants. the
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping.
2) GRAFT = This indicator measures perception of corruption: the exercise of public
power for private gain.
3) RULEL = Indicator which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both
violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary,
and the enforceability of contracts. See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999)
for an extensive description. Data obtained from the authors.
4)  PINST = This index combines indicators which measure perceptions of the
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by
possibly unconstitutional and/ or violent means.
5) REGBURDEN= An indicator of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly
policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions
of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and
business development.
6)  VOICE = This index includes indicators which measure the extent to which
citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.
Legal Origin Indicators
The five  legal system indicators are obtained from Easterly and Yu (1999). They are
zero-one dummies.
1) LEGBR = National legal system from British origin.
2) LEGFR = National legal system from French origin.
3) LEGGER = National legal system from German origin.
4) LEGSC = National legal system from Scandinavian origin.
Table A1. Correlation Matrix Governance Indicators
GOVEFF GRAFT RULEL PINST REGBURD VOICE
GOVEFF 1.000
GRAFT 0.929 1.000
RULEL 0.890 0.877 1.00025
PINST 0.794 0.750 0.877 1.000
REGBURD 0.761 0.684 0.744 0.682 1.000
VOICE 0.768 0.758 0.715 0.685 0.751 1.000
Countries in the sample
All countries for which FDI data are given in World Bank (1999). Most are
developing countries, but some developed countries are included.26
Appendix B.  How Robust is the Link between Schooling, FDI and Growth in
Developing Countries?
Borensztein  et al (1998) develop a growth model in which technical progress, a
determinant of growth, is represented through the variety of capital goods available.
Technical progress is itself determined by FDI as foreign firms encourage adoption
of new technologies and increase the production of capital goods, hence increase
variety. Thus, FDI leads to growth via technology spillovers that increase factor
productivity. Certain host country conditions are necessary to ensure the spillover
effects. In particular, human capital (an educated labour force) is necessary for new
technology and management skills to be absorbed. They use the following basic
estimating equation, where g is growth in real GDP, FDI is the ratio of FDI to GDP,
H is a measure of schooling and Y0 is initial GDP:
g = c0 + c1FDI + c2FDI.H + c3H + c4Y0 (B1)
Various specifications of (B1) are estimated using panels of 69 developing countries
over two periods, 1970-79 and 1980-89. They find that the coefficient on FDI is
negative when significant but the coefficient on the interaction term (FDI.H) is
positive and consistently significant. This is interpreted as implying that FDI has a
positive impact on growth but this is only realised when H is above some critical
level (estimated as 0.52); at low levels of H FDI has a negative impact on growth. If
the Borensztein et al (1998) results confirm the complementarity of FDI and human
capital in the process of diffusion, it is an important finding. The purpose of this
Appendix is to question whether the finding is robust.
Insofar as we could we used the same data and estimation method to estimate the
same equation as Borensztein et al (1998). We used SUR (with a different constant
for each of the two periods, 1970-79 and 1980-89) to estimate the variant of (1) that
includes government consumption and a measure of the black market premium.
3  The
results are in Table B1; for comparison, column 2 reproduces the basic result from
Borensztein et al (1998, Table 1, equation 1.3). Variable definitions and data sources
are listed below the table.
                                                          
3 It is not entirely clear whether Borensztein et al (1998) used the initial value or ten year
averages for these two variables. Our results are based on ten year averages. We also
experimented with the starting values of these variables in each period but the results were
unaltered.27
Table B1 FDI, Human Capital and Growth










































































Variables and sources: Standard errors in parentheses.
Initial GDP: Log of initial GDP per capita from Barro-Lee data-set (1993).
Schooling: initial value of average years of male secondary schooling, from Barro-
Lee.
Government Consumption: average over ten year periods of  real government
consumption as a proportion of real GDP, from Barro-Lee.
Black market premium): 1+ log(black market premium), average over ten year
periods from Barro-Lee.
FDI: FDI/GDP ratio, data provided by Borensztein and Lee.
Our sample size over the two periods differs from Borensztein et al (1998), who
report 69 observations in each period.  Regression 1 (Table B1) uses all available
data, giving 75 observations for the first period and 72 for the second period.
Regression 2 uses data only for those countries defined as developing (according to
World Bank publications), giving 68 observations for first period and 65 for second
period. Regression 3 is based on a balanced panel of 70 observations for the two
periods. Although we are not able to identify the precise sample used by Borensztein28
et al (1998), we note that our results are robust across the three different samples.
Comparing our results with those of Borensztein et al (1998), we can note that in all
respects except for the coefficients on FDI and FDI*H, the results are remarkably
similar. However, we were unable to obtain a significant coefficient on either FDI or
FDI*H. We did run the regressions with alternative measures of FDI, but the basic
results were unaffected.